2010/01/10

Clerical Quackery 7 – Physics versus Metaphysics in Ancient Greece – 3 – Aristotle


This is the 27th in a series of posts dealing with what I call “the God Lie”, the 7th in a subseries dealing with “Clerical Quackery”, and the 3rd in the sub-subseries (!) dealing with “Physics vs. Metaphysics in Ancient Greece”, i.e., dealing with skirmishes and battles that occurred in ancient Greece in the war between science and religion that has raged during at least the past 2500 years. In the first post in this sub-subseries, I tried to sketch how people from Homer to Socrates were involved in the war; in the second, I focused on the mystic Plato; in this post, the emphasis will be on Aristotle (384–322 BCE), who may have been the most brilliant person who has ever lived.

To try to reveal some of Aristotle’s astounding accomplishments, I’ll first sketch a little historical background for his ideas and summarize a little of the basics of Aristotelian logic, which in an earlier chapter I reviewed more thoroughly – although still superficially. To begin, I’ll address a fundamental problem in logic, which caused difficulties in ancient Greece, whose resolution Aristotle saw, but which continues to cause difficulties to this day. It’s the problem arising from the (unfortunately) multiple meanings of the verb “to be”.

An illustration of the problem appears in the syllogism:

God is love;
Love exists;
Therefore, God exists.

In the above ‘syllogism’ [from the Greek word syllogizesthai, from syn-, meaning ‘with’ or ‘together’, and logizeshai, to reason (from logos or ‘logic’); so, ‘syllogism’ is “putting reasoning together”] the error arises from the use of two different meanings for the verb “to be”. Thus, in the first premiss, “God is love” (which can be traced back from the New Testament to the Greek philosopher Empedocles, c.490–c.430 BCE), the verb “to be” is used to describe an assumed attribute of God (other attributes assumed, e.g., by Zarathustra, include omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence), whereas the second premiss, “Love exists”, deals with ‘existence’, which can also be expressed with the verb “to be” as “Love is”.

As a result, the conclusion of the above syllogism is unreliable, not only because it’s based on the untested and untestable assumption that “God is love” but also because the logic is unsound. That is, even if the premisses were valid, the conclusion fails to follow, because the meanings of the verb “to be” have been shifted: it’s used in the first premiss to describe attribution, whereas the conclusion relies on the assumption that “to be” can also be used to describe existence.

Such a logical fallacy (in which the meaning of words is shifted or “thrown around”) is called an amphibole or amphiboly (a Greek word derived from the prefix amphi, meaning, e.g., ‘around’, and ballein, meaning “to throw”). The silliness of the conclusion that the existence of an attribute implies the existence of the subject can be seen from:

Invisible flying elephants are pink;
Pink exists;
Therefore, … !

In total, there are four different meanings or uses for the verb “to be”. The four are: 1) the ‘is’ of existence (e.g., “She is”), 2) the ‘is’ of equality (e.g., She is the same height as you), 3) the ‘is’ of attribution or predication (e.g., “She is older than you”), and 4) the use of ‘is’ as an auxiliary verb (e.g., “She is becoming confused”). If reasoning is to be sound, it’s essential that the different meanings of “to be” are used consistently.

One way to avoid logical problems derived from the multiple meanings for “to be” is to eliminate its use! For example, the above four statements can be re-expressed as: 1) “She exists”, 2) “You and she have identical heights”, 3) “Her age exceeds yours”, and 4) “The subject confuses her.” Alternatively, in logical analyses we can use symbols rather than words. Thus, we can: 1) express ‘existence’ with the “identically equal to” sign, ≡ , which has three “bars” rather than the usual two, 2) express ‘equality” with the (two-bar) “equal to” sign, = , and 3) express attribution or predication using set theory, e.g., “Consider the set of all people whose age exceeds yours; the set includes her.” Note that, in logic, there’s rarely need to use “to be” as an auxiliary verb.

“To be or not to be”
Turning now to some basic ideas of logic, most fundamental is a set of two elementary scientific principles, discovered by fish, monkeys, and eventually people, but apparently first appreciated by Aristotle. These two principles are that: 1) some things exist in reality (e.g., bananas) and 2) such things are distinct (i.e., the banana on the ground is not the same as the banana still in the tree). Those two principles are usually written as 1) A ≡ A (read as “A is identically equal to A”, by which is meant that A exists) and 2) A ≢ ¬A or A ≢ ~A (either of which are read as “A is not identically equal to not-A”), by which is meant that the A being considered is distinct.

In ancient Greece, the “father of logic”, Aristotle, formulated these two principles as follows (from Part 3 of Book IV of his Metaphysics):
This, then, is the most certain of all principles… it is impossible for the same man [maybe Aristotle should have said “the sane man”!] at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms.
Not to disparage the huge accomplishments of Aristotle to begin to describe how people put ideas together (i.e., create syllogisms), yet it’s unfortunately the case that Aristotelian logic has some severe limitations. I reviewed some of the limitations in chapters entitled Basic Ideas in Logic, Reason vs. Reality, and “Truth” and Understanding. One of the limitations in his logic (arising from ambiguity in language) can already be seen in the above quotation from his Metaphysics.

Thus, in his statement, “it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be”, ambiguity arises from different meaning for the verb “to be”. Possibilities include the following:

1) If by “to be” he meant ‘existence’, then his statement could be written as
… it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be [or “to exist”; i.e., A ≡ A] and not to be [or “not to exist”; i.e., A ≢ A];
2) If by “to be” he meant ‘identity’, then his statement could be written as
… it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be [equal to something else, e.g., A = B] and not to be [equal to the same thing, i.e., A ≠ B];
3) If, instead, he was using “to be” for ‘predication’ (i.e., according to my dictionary, “to state, affirm, or assert something about the subject of a sentence or an argument of proposition”), then his statement could be written as
… it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be [a member of the set of, e.g., beautiful things] and not to be [a member of the same set].
In this third possibility (dealing with predication) an additional complication can arise because words can be imprecise (compared, for example, with the language of mathematics). Thus, the concept in the third rewrite (above) can be quite wrong: someone can be simultaneously beautiful (e.g., in appearance) as well as ugly (e.g., in interactions with other people).

Being careful with the definition of words (and, in general, Aristotle was so careful with his definitions that his writings can drive attentive readers up the wall!), Aristotle proceeded to formulate logic for cases in which “to be” is used to express attributions (that is, the “to be” of predication). Thus, from the scientific principles that things exist, A ≡ A, and are distinct, A ≢ ¬A, Aristotle proposed that humans who desired that their thoughts conform to reality must adhere to the following “axioms of logics”: 1) “the law of identify”, A = A (read as “A is equal to A” – and notice the difference between the identity and the equal signs), 2) “the law of noncontradiction”, A ≠ ¬A (read as “A is not equal to not-A”), and 3) “the law of the excluded middle”, which in set theory can be described as: A can not be both a member and not a member of a specified set – a “law” that has caused subsequent logicians a great many difficulties defining some sets, e.g., see Russell’s paradox.

In part because of such complications, the “laws” of logic shouldn’t be called “laws”. Instead, they should be described as statements of scientific principles (that some things exist and are distinct). And being “only” scientific principles (similar to the scientific principles – not laws! – of mechanics, thermodynamics, etc.), then consistent with Popper’s principle, we can claim at most that they are falsifiable but (in the main, i.e., excluding “the law of the excluded middle”!) are not yet falsified.

Aristotle’s statement of the “law” of the excluded middle is the following (from his book Posterior Analytics, bk. I, pt. 11):
It is impossible to affirm and deny simultaneously the same predicate of the same subject.
His statement of the “law” of non-contradiction is the following (Metaphysics, IV, 3):
For a principle which everyone must have who understands anything… which everyone must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently, then, such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject…
Aristotle’s statement of the “law” of identity was as given a few paragraphs earlier – depending on exactly what he might have meant by his use of the verb “to be”, i.e., if he was using it to represent ‘existence’ or ‘identity” or ‘predication’! He states the principle more forcefully in his Metaphysics (XI, 5):
There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived, but must always, on the contrary recognize the truth; viz., that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, or admit any other similar pair of opposites.
Pre-Aristotelian Logic
To gain some appreciation of Aristotle’s huge accomplishments in logic, consider first what some earlier Greeks said about ‘reason’, starting with one of the few fragments we have from the mystical mathematician Pythagoras (c.580–500 BCE), from about 200 years before Aristotle: “Reason is immortal, all else mortal.” Such a statement illustrates a mistake made by many people, even today: when they don’t understand something (e.g., reason, love, life, how the universe came into existence…) they have a tendency to worship it. The Greek playwright Sophocles (c.495–406 BCE) wrote: “Reason is God’s crowning gift to man.” Thereby, Sophocles was just as wrong as Pythagoras: no god ever had anything to do with creating reason. Instead, as I tried to outline above and in earlier chapters, reason is simply the application to thoughts of two fundamental principles (discovered by animals millions of years ago) that things exist and are distinct (i.e., A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A).

Parmenides (or “Parmen’s son”; c.515–c.450 BCE) appears to be the first who came close to recording that humans and other animals assumed A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A. He was born in the Greek city-state of Elea (or Elia) on the western side of southern Italy and founded the Eleatic school of philosophy. About 150 years later, Aristotle wrote that Parmenides (“one of the Italians” i.e., one of the Greek settlers in Italy) was a student of Xenophanes (the fellow who saw: “All is but a woven web of guesses”). Parmenides most famous statements are: “what is, is” and “what is not, is not”. Those statements are close to saying A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A, but one can argue that what Parmenides said was “some things exist in reality and other things don’t”, without including the idea that the things that exist are distinct. That is, his statement that “what is not, is not” doesn’t mean A ≢ ¬A, but that some things (such as gods and invisible pink elephants that fly) don’t exist in reality but only as ideas; it doesn’t include the concept that things can’t be what they’re not (i.e., A ≢ ¬A).

Unfortunately, Parmenides also wrote:
Whatever can be spoken [of] or thought of necessarily is, since it is possible for it to be, but it is not possible for nothing to be.
And in case there’s doubt that he could have made such a huge mistake, in the same poem (The Way of Truth), he stated the same idea again, somewhat differently:
It is the same thing – to think of something and to think that it is – since you will never find thought without what-is, to which it refers, and on which it depends.
That means that invisible pink elephants (and gods) are really flying around all over the place – because “whatever can be spoken [of] or thought of necessarily is…” To which one could respond, in the vernacular, “Gimme a break!”

During the next ~2500 years, thousands of philosophers, hundreds of thousands of clerics, and billions of people went off on absurd tangents from the crazy idea that “whatever can be… thought of necessarily is…” For example, as I outlined in the previous post, Plato and his followers convinced themselves that gods and immortal souls were flying around all over the place. Two thousand (or so) years after Plato, Descartes continued the same dumb idea: he convinced himself not only that he existed (“I think; therefore, I am” – rather than the more nearly correct: “I think; therefore, I’m thinking”!) but also that God existed, because he (Descartes) could imagine God. After Descartes, Hegel continued this foolishness with “the real is rational [which may be true] and the rational is real [prove it!]”, which in turn led to Marx’s foolishness and communism. Meanwhile, all organized religions are still based on Parmenides’ absurd idea that “whatever can be… thought of necessarily is…”

After Parmenides, more silliness was promoted by Empedocles (c.490–430 BCE). Empedocles lived in a Greek city in Sicily, and if he didn’t know Parmenides (although I wouldn’t be surprised if he studied under him), he essentially certainly studied Parmenides’ poem (quoted above) and he unfortunately adopted Pythagoras’ ideas about reincarnation. As summarized by Professor Barry D. Smith at his Ancient Greek Philosophy website:
Empedocles accepts Parmenides’ view that ultimately there is no generation or destruction; what is, is, and cannot come into being or perish. Fragments 11, 12 says,

Fools! – for they have no far-reaching thoughts – who deem that what-before-was-not comes into being, or that anything can perish and be utterly destroyed. For it cannot be that anything can arise from what in no way is, and it is impossible and unheard of that what is should perish; for it will always be, wherever one may keep putting it.
Such a conclusion apparently seemed obvious (and still seems obvious!) to the mystics of the world, consistent with their desire for eternal life, described by Empedocles as follows:
When, released from the body, you ascend to the free ether; you will become an immortal god, escaping death.
Ancient Greek (and subsequent) physicists, however, considered the mystics to be the “fools”. Currently, an enormous body of evidence supports the conclusion that a huge variety of things “come into being” from “what-before-was-not” (from self-replicating molecules to their abilities to form DNA and consciousness, from elementary particles to their abilities to create stars and black holes, and from photons to possibly the universe itself). It’s therefore reasonable to conclude that “immortal souls” also “came into being” from “what-before-was-not”, where by “came into being” is meant that they exist only as ideas in the minds of mystics, one definition of whom could be: those who agree with Parmenides that “whatever can be… thought of necessarily is…”!

Yet, it was an important contribution by Parmenides to begin to formulate the fundamental scientific principles that A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A. 2500 years later, these fundamental principles of science – or stated equivalently, these fundamental premisses of logic (that things exist and are distinct) – have yet to be demonstrated wrong. But when Parmenides proposed that whatever could be imagined also exists, he unfortunately abandoned common sense.

Parmenides also abandoned common sense by rejecting the idea of Heraclitus (c.540–c.480 BCE) that “all is flux”. Instead, “rejecting the reality of change… for [Parmenides] all was one indivisible, unchanging reality, and any appearances to the contrary were illusions, to be dispelled by reason and revelation.” Parmenides’ most famous student, Zeno of Elea (c.490–c.430 BCE), carried this abandonment of common sense to an extreme, resulting in some famous paradoxes, parts of which remained unresolved for more than 2,000 years!

Zeno’s Paradoxes
Zeno of Elea (distinct from Zeno of Citium, who founded the Stoic school of philosophy about 150 years later) apparently traveled with Parmenides, including a trip to Athens where (according to Plato) they met with Socrates when he was about 20 and Parmenides was about 65. As readers probably know, one of Zeno’s most famous paradoxes posits that, in a race, “swift Achilles” could never overtake a tortoise, because when Achilles would, say, cut the distance between them in half, the tortoise would move a small distance forward; when Achilles cut the new distance between them in half, the tortoise would again move a small distance forward; and so on, to infinity. Therefore, Zeno argued, Achilles would never catch up to the tortoise. Of course, common sense responds: “Gimme a break; things pass other things all the time!”

Equally obvious is the time when Achilles would pass the tortoise. Thus, if the speed of Achilles is Sa, then the location of Achilles, La, at any time, T, is given by La = Sa x T . If the tortoise is given a head start of HS and if it moves at speed St, then the tortoise’s location, Lt, at any time is Lt = HS + (St x T). So, the time when the two locations are equal (i.e., when Achilles catches up to the tortoise and will subsequently pass it) can be found by equating the two locations: La = Sa x T = HS + (St x T) = Lt. Solving for the time gives the result that Achilles catches up to the tortoise at time T = HS / (Sa – St). For example, if the speed of Achilles is 11 m/s and tortoise is given a head start of 100 m but moves at 1 m/s (very rapid for a tortoise!), then Achilles would overtake the tortoise in (100 m) / (11 m/s – 1 m/s) = 10 seconds.

Actually, although Zeno’s paradoxes may now seem to be rather silly, they had profound implications for philosophers in ancient Greece – and later! As the mathematician and philosopher Alfred Whitehead wrote in 1947:
I am fond of pointing out to my pupils that to be refuted in every century after you have written is the acme of triumph. I always make that remark in connection with Zeno. No one has ever touched Zeno without refuting him, and every century thinks it worthwhile to refute him.
And although Zeno’s paradoxes did provide later philosophers with many challenges, more important was Zeno’s method: he applied to philosophical questions what’s now called the method of reductio ad absurdum (“reduction to absurdity”), which may have already been available in mathematics in the Pythagorean school. Thus, as stated by the Roman writer Apulius in his book The Defense (Sec. 1, Pt. 4), Zeno “was the first to discover that most ingenious device of refuting hypotheses by the method of self-inconsistency.” The method became known in ancient Greece as “the dialectic”, from Greek dialektikÄ“, meaning “(art) of debate”, from dialegesthai, meaning “converse with”. Stated differently, Zeno thereby realized that paradoxes can’t exist, because A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A.

Apparently, though, Zeno didn’t realize that the method to resolve any apparent paradox (obtained by sound reasoning) is to check the premisses, because at least one of them must be wrong – or if he realized the method, he wasn’t able to apply it. If Zeno had applied the method, he might have made some amazing discoveries, including calculus, how to sum infinite series, and maybe even quantum mechanics!

Nonetheless, Zeno still deserves substantial credit, because he was smart enough to notice that something was wrong, posing some paradoxes. Instead of doing a simple calculation to determine the time when Achilles would overtake the tortoise, Zeno apparently claimed that his argument demonstrated that Parmenides was right (that change was an illusion) and that our senses couldn’t be trusted. And in a way, he was right: our senses have their limitations. It’s usually a good idea, however, to trust “common sense”, because for every one of the few times that it may mislead, there’ll be a thousand-or-more times that common sense will be more reliable than any philosophical or religious argument! And when someone reaches a nonsensical conclusion such as runners can’t pass one another, or all invisible flying elephants are pink, or God made us in his image, then a reasonable response would be something similar to: “Have you spent much time trying to identify either errors in your reasoning or your incorrect premisses?”

In particular, Zeno’s arguments contain many faulty premisses: 1) His failure to understand the concept of instantaneous speed (which, about 330 years ago, Newton and Leibniz independently resolved by taking ratios of infinitesimals, thereby creating differential calculus), 2) His assumption that forever cutting the distance between Achilles and the tortoise in half (with words such as “and so on, to infinity”) would still leave a finite distance between them, and thereby, his assumption that the infinite series wouldn’t converge (which, about 250 years ago, Euler showed was wrong), 3) His assumption that infinities weren’t countable (which, about 140 years ago, Cantor resolved with his theory of transfinite numbers), 4) His assumption that the positions and speeds (or momenta) of both Achilles and the tortoise (even when the differences in positions shrunk to atomic sizes) could always be specified exactly (which, about 80 years ago, Heisenberg showed was wrong, providing the foundation for quantum mechanics), and 5) His assumption that infinities exist in reality, an assumption that has no evidential support even though the idea is routinely used in pure mathematics and essentially all religions.

About 100 years after Zeno, Aristotle proposed a resolution of Zeno’s paradox about Achilles and the tortoise. It’s a rather tortuous explanation (given in pts. 6–9 of bk. VI of his book Physics), because he first tries very hard to understand and describe ‘time’, ‘motion’, and ‘continuity’, but the essence of his argument is correct:
Now since the motion of everything that is in motion occupies a period of time, and a greater magnitude is traversed in a longer time, it is impossible that a thing should undergo a finite motion in an infinite time…
In fact, if Aristotle had gone just a little further with his ideas, he probably would have discovered the concept of instantaneous speed and differential calculus. Still, Aristotle's analyses of the meaning of ‘continuity’ (and “the continuum”) formed the basis of all “continuum mechanics” (e.g., of solids, liquids, and gases), which was universally used in mechanics until the start of the 20th Century, when the discrete nature of some things and processes was found to be important, leading to quantum mechanics.

“Measure for Measure”
After the mistakes made by Parmenides and Zeno, there were many generations of quiet-muddled thinking (especially by Plato), until Aristotle put reasoning back on track. In the first generation after Parmenides, Protagoras (c.485–c.415 BCE) made a little progress with logic. He was the fellow whom I mentioned two posts ago who was charged with “impiety” and whose books were burned because they contained the honest and totally justifiable (agnostic) statement: “Respecting the gods, I am unable to know whether they exist or do not exist”. One of his few other statements that survived the clerics’ burning of his books was: “Man is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is; of what is not, that it is not.” That’s a great statement, both understandable and correct, but it’s more a statement about humans than about Nature’s principles that A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A.

Maybe Protagoras was responding to the clerics who promoted people’s “belief” in the existence of various gods (if not invisible, flying, pink elephants!); it’s then a great “declaration of independence” to say: “Man is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is; of what is not, that it is not”, i.e., “I’ll decide whether or not invisible flying elephants are pink!” Or maybe Protagoras was responding to the silly statement of Parmenides, “Whatever can be… thought of necessarily is…”; it’s then a great response to say: “Man is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is; of what is not, that it is not”, i.e., “I’ll decide what is and what isn’t!” On the other hand, any implication from Protagoras’ statement that an individual’s decision (about what exists) being a valid “measure” of anything’s existence in reality would be quite wrong: just because someone decides that gods exist doesn’t mean that they do! As Aristotle wrote (Metaphysics, XI, 6):
The saying of Protagoras is like the views we have mentioned; he said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply that, that which seems to each man also assuredly is. If this were so, it follows that the same thing both is and is not, and is bad and good, and that the contents of all other opposite statements are true, because often a particular thing appears beautiful to some and the contrary of beautiful to others, and that which appears to each man is the measure… But to attend equally to the opinions and the fancies of disputing parties is childish; for clearly one of them must be mistaken.
In the same generation as Protagoras (about 10 years younger) was Socrates (469–399 BCE). As I mentioned two posts ago, what’s known about Socrates is only what others recorded, and most of what was recorded was by his student Plato (c.428–c.348 BCE). It’s then essentially impossible to know the origin of ideas that Plato attributed to Socrates – or attributed to others. Thus, although I don’t know the source of it, the idea that A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A was recorded by Plato in about 380 BCE in his book Euthydemus.

More of Plato’s Word Games
It appears that Euthydemus was a student of Protagoras, and I’d like to quote a portion of the (alleged) dialogue between Euthydemus and Socrates (as reported by Plato), because some of this dialogue provides an example of the “muddled mess of thinking” that existed before Aristotle, a mess that Socrates (or Plato) partially straightened out and that, later, Aristotle almost straightened out. The alleged conversation starts with the following:
“Then tell me,” he [Euthydemus] said [to Socrates], “do you know anything?”

“Yes,” I [Socrates] said, “I know many things, but not anything of much importance.”

“That will do,” he said. “And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time, is not what it is?” [That question contains the ambiguity derived from the verb “to be”. Thus, one doesn’t know if the question refers to existence, identity, or set membership.]

“Certainly not.” [i.e., I, Socrates, maintain that what is, is, and is not what it’s not.]

“And did you not say that you knew something?”

“I did.”

“If you know, you are knowing.”

“Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.”

“That makes no difference. And must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?”

“Certainly not,” I said, “for there are many other things which I do not know.”

“And if you do not know, you are not knowing.”

“Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.”

“Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to the same things.”

“A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! And will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also [cannot] not be? And therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time. And if I know all things, then I must have the knowledge for which we are seeking. May I assume this to be your ingenious notion?”

“Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted,” he said.
Euthydemus (i.e., in reality, Plato) then goes on with similar absurdities to “demonstrate” that Socrates knows all things, knew all things when he was born – because it was knowledge possessed by his immortal soul!

A second strange feature of the above report is that Plato seems to have believed the result (i.e., that each person has a “soul” that knows all things and always knew all things), and yet, Plato reports how Socrates demonstrated Euthydemus’ errors. Thus, Plato reports that Socrates states (to someone else who was “tripped up” by Euthydemus or his brother):
The two foreign gentlemen [Euthydemus and his brother] perceiving that [you] did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word ‘to learn’ [or the word ‘know’] has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter is generally called ‘knowing’ rather than ‘learning,’ but the word ‘learning’ is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you, that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and over setting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his friend overturned and laid on his back.
Plato thus reported that Socrates saw that these disciples of Protagoras (“Sophists”) were just playing “word games”, and yet, although Plato was apparently aware that the Sophists were capitalizing on failures to define words carefully, Plato in his writings trapped himself in his own word games! He appears to have relied on the foolishness of Parmenides’ statement, “Whatever can be… thought of necessarily is…”, and from that blunder (plus not being careful with definitions), he made an enormous number of mistakes, mistakes that, to this day (as I tried to outline in the previous post) continue to be perpetuated by all ideologues, including the promoters of all religions.

Plato’s Euthyphro Dilemma
Still another mess left by Plato is associated with what’s now called “the Euthyphro dilemma”. Unlike paradoxes (which can’t exist – at least so long as the scientific principles that A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A remain valid!), dilemmas can exist (e.g., not being able to have your cake and eat it, too – or whether to pronounce 'Euthyphro' as “u-THY-froh” or “U-thuh-froh”!).

The source of the dilemma is Plato’s statement (allegedly quoting Socrates) in Plato’s book Euthyphro:
… whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
A more modern version, stated as a question for monotheists, might be:
Is something moral because God said so, or did God say so, because it’s moral?
The dilemma follows from consideration of the two options. Thus, on the one hand, if something is moral because God said so, then morality seems to be nothing more than God’s whim: if God orders people to kill their children or if God murders homosexuals, drowns people, kills children and unbelievers, promotes rape and genocide, kills his own son, etc. (as He allegedly does, according to the Bible), then what hideous person would want anything to do with the morality of such a monster? And on the other hand, if God says something is moral because it is (that is, because morality is somehow “built into the fabric of the universe”, as the ancient Hindus maintained about Ritam, the ancient Egyptians maintained about Ma’at, Zarathustra maintained about Asha, etc., including the Chinese Tao), then why don’t people just skip what God (i.e., any “holy book”) has to say about morality and seek to discern “the moral order” to which the wimpy God is required to conform?

In general, if one encounters a dilemma that can’t be resolved, one is forced either to live with the dilemma (which most people find difficult to do) or to choose one of the available options. In the case of the Euthyphro dilemma, Jewish and Muslim clerics advocated (and still advocate) choosing the option that God is all-powerful (and that his ways are too mysterious for mere humans to understand). That is, consistent with the primitive, patriarchal, tribal customs that they “deified”, Jewish and Muslim clerics maintained (and still maintain) that whatever the all-powerful Yahweh or Allah said or did (as alleged in their “holy books”) is right, by definition, fundamentally because they adopt the law of the jungle (“might makes right”) – and wouldncha know, the clerics just happen to be the powerful god’s earthly representatives, so you’d better do exactly as they say.

If a resolution to a dilemma is possible, then in principle at least, the resolution can be found in either of two ways: by uncovering faulty logic or by removing unjustified, faulty premisses. For example, upon being told that they can’t have their cake and eat it, too, many children will recognize that the dilemma is derived from the “false dichotomy” logical fallacy – and proceed to eat only a portion of their cake! Similarly, Plato’s (and subsequent Christian clerics’) proposed resolution to the Euthyphro dilemma was to assume that God is “all good” and, therefore, He would never prescribe anything evil as being moral. Consistently, in The Republic, Plato proposed censorship of all suggestions (such as those in Homer and Hesiod) that the gods behaved immorally – and subsequent Christian clerics followed Plato’s recommendation to kill anyone who said otherwise. (And actually, subsequent Muslim clerics adopted similar policies, e.g., “kill the infidels”, even though they also adopted and still promote the option that whatever God says is right, because “might makes right” – illustrating that clerics don’t feel constrained by logic, so long as they can continue to be parasites.)

The alternative (resolving dilemmas by identifying one or more faulty premisses) is the same method used to eliminate all paradoxes derived from sound logic. Such is the method used by scientific humanists to resolve the Euthyphro dilemma. Thus, given the substantial evidence [which I’ve at least sketched in early posts (e.g., here) and chapters (e.g., start here)] showing that morality is derived from experiences gained by social animals (such as dolphins, monkeys, elephants, and humans) in how to live together cooperatively, scientific humanists reject the data-less, unjustified premiss (or better, “mere speculation”!) that any god exists or has ever existed. Thereby, the Euthyphro dilemma collapses into meaningless mumbo-jumbo, typical of Plato’s mystical ramblings (and similar balderdash in all “holy books” promoted by clerics).

Aristotle
In contrast to Socrates’ student Plato, Plato’s student Aristotle surpassed his teacher. Two examples are Aristotle’s analyses and rejections of Plato’s ideas of Forms (outlined in the previous post) and Plato’s idea of souls (outlined in an earlier chapter), leading to Aristotle’s famous statement: “while both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.”

There’s no doubt that Aristotle was brilliant. He was in the same league as Epicurus, Spinoza, Hume, Jefferson, Darwin, and Einstein. He was also a prolific writer – and now, it’s wonderful that his 29 books are just a few clicks away, courtesy computers, the internet, and tremendous websites such as Greek Texts and the Internet Classics Archive at MIT. Some praise of Aristotle, however, may be too profuse, e.g., Cicero described his books as “a river of flowing gold”; instead, readers might agree more with the assessment that Aristotle drowns his readers in a flood of unnecessary repetitions and pedantry – even while agreeing that his books contain nuggets of brilliance.

For purposes of this series of posts dealing with the God Lie, however, it would be a distraction to try to survey all of Aristotle’s brilliant accomplishments. Instead, I’ll focus on some of the ways that he corrected Plato’s erroneous ideas and then comment on some of Aristotle’s own errors. I should also include at least a brief version of Aristotle’s biography, since he participated in initiating many ideas whose repercussions continue to this day.

The Greek Texts website reviews that Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was born in Macedonia, where his father was court physician. At age 18, he traveled to Athens and studied under Plato. When he was 37 (when Plato died), Aristotle left Athens for Atarneus in Asia Minor and married the ruler’s niece. A few years after Aristotle moved to Atarneus, King Philip II of Macedonia summoned him to become the tutor of his 13-year-old son Alexander, later known as “Alexander the Great.”

Relevant to the next post (dealing with the accomplishments of Epicurus, Zeno the Stoic, and others), I want to add that, accompanying Aristotle to Atarneus was another of Plato’s former students, Xenocrates, whose later lectures were said to have been attended by Epicurus and Zeno the Stoic. Similar to Aristotle, Xenocrates was a prolific writer, writing books on topics similar to those addressed by Aristotle. In contrast to Aristotle, however, Xenocrates promoted Plato’s Theory of Forms. In addition, Xenocrates attempted to resolve the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea by proposing (without justification) that some magnitudes were indivisible.

In about 335 BCE, when Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE) started his Asiatic campaign, Aristotle returned to Athens and opened his own school. It’s reported that, similar to Plato, Aristotle expounded his philosophy in “popular language” in various Dialogues, which were lost; what we have are his 29 more formal treatises (which may have been lost or hidden for ~200 years after his death, a year after Alexander’s death). It has been suggested that some of Aristotle’s surviving books were lecture notes recorded by his students, but from my experiences, it's difficult for me to imagine how any student could have recorded such details as appear throughout his books. Below, I’ll briefly review a few of his ideas, including his ideas about souls and gods – although in some cases, it’s difficult (and even inappropriate) to isolate such ideas from his other ideas; for example, his erroneous idea about God followed logically from the errors he made in physics.

Some of Aristotle’s Accomplishments
In the previous post I already showed at least a little of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Forms. Here, I’ll add only a few more comments. As readers can find, Aristotle devotes most of his book Metaphysics to debunking Plato’s (or Pythagoras’) idea of Forms and a “good” god, involved in human affairs. As an example, Aristotle struck devastating blows to the foundation of Plato’s attempt to meld Pythagorean ideas about numbers and Socrates’ ideas about “the Good” (with a capital ‘G’, no less) with his comments: “but the mathematical sciences take no account of goods and evils” and “the impossible results of this view [Plato’s] would take too long to enumerate.”

With respect to the setting for Aristotle’s ideas about souls, recall (e.g., from the previous post) that Plato proposed some bizarre ideas about souls and “eternal life”, which were subsequently used to construct the theoretical abominations subsequently called Christianity and Islam. In turn, Plato probably obtained his ideas from the Egyptians and from the Pythagoreans, and in turn, Pythagoras probably picked up his ideas from the Egyptians and perhaps from the Zoroastrians and Hindus. In contrast to the possibility of automatically adopting such ideas from “the ancients” and in conformity with Socrates’ recommendation to be careful with definitions, Aristotle started his book On the Soul by carefully examining what “the ancients” seemed to have meant by the word ‘soul’.

Thus, in Part 1 of Book I of On the Soul, Aristotle states: “The soul is in some sense the principle of animal life.” He then summarizes his investigation of the meaning of the word ‘soul’ (bk. II, pt. 1):
We have now given an answer to the question, What is soul? – an answer which applies to it in its full extent. It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing’s essence.
Stated differently, if Aristotle could have used modern terminology, he might have said: “the soul is the DNA sequencing that defines any life form’s genetic code”! Aristotle then proceeded to the obvious conclusion:
From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body…
Thereby, Aristotle not only undermined Plato’s (and Pythagoras’ and the Zoroastrian/ Hindu/ Egyptian – and subsequent Christian/ Islamic…) idea of soul, he prepared the way for what, still today, should destroy all religious people’s silly ideas about “immortal souls” – if only religious people would begin to base their idea on evidence rather than on dreamy speculations!

That is, consistent with Aristotle’s idea that “the soul is inseparable from its body”, modern neurology has provided a vast amount of evidence that a person’s character, outlook on life, behavior, etc. (or, as religious people would say, a person’s ‘soul’) can be changed dramatically by physical or chemical changes in the brain. The obvious conclusion, then, is that there’s no “ghost in the machine” (i.e., ‘soul’); instead, the brain, itself, is what religious people are wont to call ‘soul’. As “Ebonmuse” recently wrote at his blog:
As Carl Sagan observed, the history of the human species is a series of great demotions. The first was the Copernican revolution, demoting Earth from the center of the universe to one planet among many. The religious conservatives fought against this for a long time, but for the most part, they’ve come to accept it. The second was the Darwinian revolution, making human beings just one species among many, rather than the apex of creation. The religious conservatives, for the most part, have refused to come to terms with this and are still fighting against it. The third one, I think, is going to be the neurological revolution – the one that shows our mind is the result of physical causes, rather than the product of a supernatural soul. For the most part, religious conservatives haven’t even felt this blow yet. But I think, when its full force is recognized, it’s going to be the most decisive one of all. The knowledge that the mind is a physical phenomenon strikes directly at religious belief, far more so than evolution or heliocentrism do.
Stated differently, now that ample evidence is available to debunk Plato’s (and earlier people’s) idea of ‘soul’ (a “ghost in the machine”), maybe religious fundamentalists will finally accept Aristotle’s idea!

Aristotle made many other contributions, but attempting to outline them all would distract from the goal of this series of posts. Earlier in this post and in an earlier chapter, I outlined some of his astounding accomplishments in logic; in summary, it’s a testament to his brilliance that limitations on “Aristotelian logic” have been uncovered only during the most recent century. In earlier chapters, I already addressed some of his ideas about ethics (e.g., here and here) and about politics (e.g., here and here).

In this post, I should at least mention that, in addition to demolishing Plato’s ideas about Forms and souls, Aristotle demolished Plato’s damnable ideas (described in Plato’s Republic, which I criticized in the previous post) about “the ideal society” (i.e., a communistic, totalitarian, theocracy, much like today’s Iran). Instead, Aristotle’s analysis in his Politics led to such gems as the following:
• Man is by nature a political animal.

• Political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship.

• The two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection [are] that a thing is your own and that it is your only one [which undermines not only communism but also the polygamy of Islam].

• If liberty and equality… are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost.

• The best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class.

• The basis of a democratic state is liberty.

• Law is order, and good law is good order.

Some of Aristotle’s Major Mistakes
Unfortunately, Aristotle also made many mistakes, and as inconsistent as it may seem, reliance on logic was his nemesis – as it is, to this day, with all religious philosophers who claim to be logical. Thus, although Aristotle obviously realized that sound logic provides knowledge consistent with assumptions, yet he apparently didn’t realize (what modern-day religious philosophers still don’t seem to realize) that logic can never produce new information – only knowledge that’s consistent with existing information. Therefore, for example (as I’ve described in detail elsewhere), it’s impossible to use logic to prove that any god exists (or has ever existed), since such a demonstration would yield new information. Thereby, all the claimed “logical proofs of God’s existence” are, as Kant said, “So much… labor lost.” Instead, the only way to demonstrate that any god exists would be to provide relevant evidence.

Many of Aristotle’s errors can be traced to his major mistake of starting from Socrates’ unproductive (even counterproductive) view of science, which Aristotle described as follows:
For two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates – inductive arguments and universal definitions, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science.
That assessment is consistent with Plato’s reports that Socrates spent his time talking to people, trying to determine what they meant by various concepts (such as honor, truth, wisdom, etc.) and then trying to find some common features of these concepts from which he could generalize (i.e., some common features from which, by induction, he could infer general principles). Such a procedure is, however, not the “starting-point of science.” Instead, as emphasized and repeatedly demonstrated by (especially) “the father of modern medicine” Hippocrates (c.460–377 BCE, a contemporary of Socrates), the “starting point (and essence!) of science” is the scientific method, i.e., observe, try to infer some hypothesis from the observations, and then perform experiments to test predictions of the hypothesis.

Aristotle’s failure to appreciate the essence of science (i.e., his emphasis on definitions rather than data), as well as historical consequences of his failure, were well summarized by the 20th century philosopher Karl Popper in Section II of Chapter 11 of his book The Open Society and Its Enemies and in Chapter 6, entitled “Two Kinds of Definitions”, of Popper Selections (David Miller, Ed., Princeton University Press, 1985). Below, I’ve melded quotations from those two sources.
In science, we take care that the statements we make should never depend upon the meaning of our terms. Even where the terms are defined, we never try to derive any information from the definition, or to base any argument upon it. This is why our terms make so little trouble. We do not overburden them. We try to attach to them as little weight as possible. We do not take their “meaning” too seriously. We are always conscious that our terms are a little vague (since we have learnt to use them only in practical applications) and we reach precision not by reducing their penumbra of vagueness, but rather by keeping well within it, by carefully phrasing our sentences in such a way that the possible shades of meaning do not matter. This is how we avoid quarrelling about words.

Our “scientific knowledge”, in the sense in which this term may be properly used, remains entirely unaffected if we eliminate all definitions; the only effect is upon our language, which would lose, not precision, but merely brevity…

There could hardly be a greater contrast than that between this view of the part played by definitions, and Aristotle’s view. For Aristotle’s essentialist definitions [i.e., in which a word is burdened with “capturing the essence” of some thing or process] are [imagined to be] the principles from which all our knowledge is derived; they thus [are imagined to] contain all our knowledge; and they [are imagined to] serve to substitute a long formula for a short one. As opposed to this… scientific… definitions do not contain any knowledge whatever, nor even any ‘opinion’; they do nothing but introduce new arbitrary shorthand labels; they cut a long story short.

The problem of definitions and of the “meaning of terms” is the most important source of Aristotle’s regrettably still prevailing intellectual influence, of all that verbal and empty scholasticism that haunts not only the Middle Ages, but our own contemporary philosophy [and all religions!]; for even a philosophy as recent as that of L. Wittgenstein suffers… from this influence.

The development of thought since Aristotle could, I think, be summed up by saying that every discipline, as long as it used the Aristotelian method of definition [such as in all religions!] has remained arrested in a state of empty verbiage and barren scholasticism, and that the degree to which the various sciences have been able to make any progress depended on the degree to which they have been able to get rid of this essentialist method…

…Aristotle’s doctrine of definition… led to a good deal of hairsplitting. But later, philosophers began to feel that one cannot argue about definitions. In this way, essentialism not only encouraged verbalism, but it also led to the disillusionment with argument, that is, with reason. Scholasticism [,] mysticism [,] and despair in reason [the hallmarks of all organized religions!]… are the unavoidable results of the essentialism of Plato and Aristotle…
In spite of Aristotle’s major error to emphasize definitions rather than data, Aristotle did appreciate that all his analyses relied on certain “primary premisses.” He didn’t see, however, that the reliability of his primary premisses could be judged only through experimental tests of their predictions, instead proposing and promoting the blatant stupidity (Posterior Analytics, I, 31):
Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception.
In Posterior Analytics (II, 19), he went on to propose the following nonsense (to which I’ve added the italics):
From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premisses – a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premiss, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact.
Aristotle’s bizarre proposals that “intuition [apprehends] the primary premisses” (a proposal that, during the 20th Century, Kurt Gödel pursued, even after he proved his incompleteness theorem, and drove himself insane attempting to prove) and that “intuition [is] the originative source of scientific knowledge” led Aristotle to another major mistake, which I’ll summarize as follows: by failing to see that the only authority in science is evidence and by claiming, instead, that intuition is the source of scientific knowledge, Aristotle became an authoritarian, demanding that others acknowledge his intuition (and resulting pronouncements and definitions) as “the authority”.

To illustrate and try to explain what a I mean, as well as to suggest why Aristotle’s authoritarianism was successful for so long, I’ll start with his famous statement (from his Metaphysics, I, 1): “Man by nature desires to know.” Thereby, although Aristotle didn’t realize how knowledge of the world external to our minds can be gained (i.e., via the scientific method), yet he not only saw that humans have a desire to know, he also saw (perhaps intuitively!) that humans unfortunately have a propensity to accept even crazy “explanations” (such as the existence of various gods) as “knowledge”, if such explanations are presented with sufficient authority and give superficial appearances of explaining the unknown (e.g., “our holy book says…”). As a result and with his connections to the most powerful political authority of his time, Alexander the Great (Aristotle’s student), Aristotle became one such arrogant “authority”, dictating superficial “explanations” as “knowledge”, thereby trampling on the two-centuries-old wisdom of Xenophanes: “all is but a woven web of guesses”.

Many illustrations of Aristotle’s authoritarianism are available. One is his statement in his Metaphysics (II, 2): “Nothing infinite can exist [in reality].” That may be correct, but such a bold pronouncement can’t be justified; instead, he should have stated something similar to: “To date, nothing infinite has yet been found in reality.” Another illustration is his statement in his Physics (VIII, 1):
…that which is produced or directed by nature can never be anything disorderly: for nature is everywhere the cause of order.
He provided no justification for such a claim, and (of course) we now know that his claim is exactly contrary to the second principle of thermodynamics, one of whose statements is that, in isolated systems, nature always seeks to produce maximum disorder!

Still another example of Aristotle’s authoritarianism is in his Metaphysics (IV, 4) where he attacks those who disagree with the scientific principles that things exist and are distinct (i.e., A ≡ A and A ≢ ¬A):
There are some who… assert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be… But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles. Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one.
That’s terrible authoritarianism, and moreover, it’s plain stupid! In fact, if it weren’t for the appearance of similar statements elsewhere in his writings, I would wonder if it were a translation error – for it rather hurts to see such a brilliant mind make such a colossal error. That is, Aristotle was totally wrong to suggest that it is “for want of education” or “the mark of a man who is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from what is not” that someone would demand a demonstration of any fundamental scientific principle (or axiom). In contrast, what Aristotle should have said is that the instances of demonstrations that things exist and are distinct (i.e., that A ≡ A, that A ≢ ¬A) are so numerous that even monkeys and babies have wholeheartedly adopted these hypotheses!

Stated differently, what Aristotle should have written is that if anyone should suggest (in seriousness) that one of the fundamental axioms (or scientific principles) of logic is wrong, then the person should be strongly encouraged to demonstrate how the principles are wrong – guaranteeing a prize to anyone who can demonstrate that it’s wrong! Stated in the vernacular, if anyone should say something as horrible as the Bible’s “it’s a wicked generation that wants a sign” or Aristotle’s “[it’s] the mark of a man who is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from what is not”, then that person should be invited to blow it out his ear!

Some of Aristotle’s Specific Errors
Aristotle’s misunderstanding of the essence of science, his failure to test predictions of his hypotheses and, instead, his reliance on definitions, intuition, and authoritarianism, led him to sometimes silly and sometimes serious errors. An example of one of his silly errors was his hypothesis that women have fewer teeth than men – and he apparently never took the trouble to ask his wife (or any other woman) to open her mouth, so he could count her teeth! Yet, maybe he wasn’t on speaking terms with his wife, for as Aristotle the philosopher said:
By all means, marry. If you get a good wife, you’ll become happy; if you get a bad one, you’ll become a philosopher. [!]
Some illustrations of Aristotle’s more serious errors are available in his book Physics. As a first example, consider his fundamental premiss (from Physics, I, 5):
Our first presupposition must be that in nature nothing acts on, or is acted on by, any other thing at random, nor may anything come from anything else…
One can understand why Aristotle would make such an assumption, and one can admire Aristotle for trying so hard, so long ago, to understand Nature, but we who are accustomed to the scientific method would now inquire: What evidence supports such assumptions? What predictions follow from such a hypothesis? What are the results of experimental tests of those predictions? And, of course, we now know that, for example, all 20th century results in quantum mechanics show that both aspects of Aristotle’s “first presupposition” are wrong.

Another serious error also appears near the beginning of his book on Physics. Thus, by considering the behavior of plants, animals, and people, he concludes (bk. II, pt. 8):
If purpose, then, is inherent in art, so is it in Nature also… It is plain, then, that nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose.
Unfortunately, however, he reached his generalization considering only animate parts of nature; meanwhile, as far as is known, rocks, stars, galaxies… don’t have purposes – or stated more meaningfully, ‘purpose’ is a concept attributable only to life. Stated still differently, life has a purpose (namely, to continue living), but no evidence supports Aristotle’s assumption that inanimate Nature has any purpose. Thereby, Aristotle made the mistake of arguing by analogy, apparently not appreciating the conclusion reached by another of Socrates’ students, Euclid of Megara (c.435–c.365 BCE), that arguments by analogy never constitute “proof”. A still more serious example of Aristotle’s error of relying on an argument by analogy is his disgraceful “justification” of slavery.

Similarly, by relying only on logic (based on incorrect premisses), Aristotle erroneously concluded in his Physics (IV, 7 & 8) that a vacuum cannot exist:
It is clear, then, from these considerations that there is no separate void.
Further, in his Metaphysics (XI, 8) he erroneously added:
If, then, luck or spontaneity is a cause of the material universe, reason and nature are causes before it.
Aristotle gave no justification for such claims. We could now argue that if (for example) the universe was created by a symmetry-breaking quantum-like fluctuation in the original total void, then “before” such a “creating fluctuation”, nothing existed; therefore, neither reason (based on existence and uniqueness) nor “nature” had any meaning; therefore, they couldn’t have been “causes before it.” Instead, the “cause” of the “spontaneity” would have been simply that, similar to other quantum mechanical systems, “total nothingness” fluctuates (and some such fluctuations are unstable). But Aristotle certainly can be pardoned for taking the easier route: he assumed (e.g., Meteorology, I, 14) that “the universe is permanent”.

Relative to Aristotle’s influence on religions, his most egregious error followed from his unsupported and incorrect assumption (Physics, VII, 1):
Everything that is in motion must be moved by something.
The above error led Aristotle to conclude that there must have been a “prime mover” (God) who set things in the universe in motion, a conclusion later copied by many foolish religious philosophers, including Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). Unfortunately, Aristotle (and later religious philosophers) apparently never observed and considered motion resulting from, for example, a bubble bursting. That is, there’s no need for any external force (putting the water droplets from the bubble’s burst into motion); there’s need only that momentum be conserved (i.e., that the momenta of all exploded components of the bubble sum to the same value they had before the explosion, i.e., zero). In contrast to his silly conclusion that a God must have started all motions, if Aristotle had thought about an exploding bubble (or similar), he might have concluded that motion in the universe could have been started by a Big Bang!

Aristotle repeats the same erroneous idea in his Metaphysics (XII, 6):
… it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time should. For there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist.
Relative to the first part of the above statement (i.e., his claim that movement can’t come into being or cease to be), Aristotle apparently never saw either a bubble burst (i.e., motion come into being) or something stop moving (e.g., a ball, stopped from rolling because of friction). And relative to the second part of his claim, he can be forgiven for not seeing that time is meaningless without energy; therefore, before the Big Bang (which created motion), i.e., before there was energy, there was no time.

The culmination of his errors about motion and time appears in his Metaphysics (XII, 7), where he introduces his god as the prime mover, who (he decides, siding with Plato) must be “good”:
…The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses – that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way.
Then, stuck with the assumption that his prime mover is “good”, Aristotle produces the following gobbledygook:
… If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.
And with that error, he manages to dig himself into an even deeper hole (Metaphysics, XII, 9):
The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems; for while thought is held to be the most divine of things observed by us, the question how it must be situated in order to have that character involves difficulties. For if it thinks of nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (since that which is its substance is not the act of thinking, but a potency) it cannot be the best substance; for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it. Further, whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act of thinking, what does it think of? Either of itself or of something else; and if of something else, either of the same thing always or of something different. Does it matter, then, or not, whether it thinks of the good or of any chance thing? Are there not some things about which it is incredible that it should think? Evidently, then, it thinks of that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement. First, then, if ‘thought’ is not the act of thinking but a potency, it would be reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought of. For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing in the world, so that if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.
Thus, according to Aristotle, after God set things in motion, then (in the vernacular), God has spent eternity contemplating his own navel! Well, sorry to burst Aristotle’s (and Thomas Aquinas’, and…) bubble, but if they’d watch a bubble bursting, then they’d see no need for “a first cause” (of motion); i.e., God isn’t needed – except, of course, in the case of clerics such as Thomas Aquinas and all other clerics before and since, God is needed for them to have the time to contemplate their own navel, rather than go out a produce something useful for other humans.

But even though we can now see that Aristotle made many major errors, he was obviously an astounding genius, contributing such gems as: "It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." In that regard, consider the wisdom of what he wrote in Metaphysics (II, 1):
The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately [as Xenophanes said], while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed. Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial door, which no one can fail to hit [is the proverb about hitting a barn door that old?!], in this respect it must be easy, but the fact that we can have a whole truth and not the particular part we aim at shows the difficulty of it… It is just that we should be grateful, not only to those with whose views we may agree, but also to those who have expressed more superficial views [such as, as he points out, Pythagoras and Plato]; for these also contributed something, by developing before us the powers of thought.
By the same token, although Aristotle was wrong about much, he quite likely contributed more to “the powers of thought” than has anyone else!

Still more to his credit, Aristotle demonstrated in his Metaphysics his disdain for all theologians:
The school of Hesiod and all the theologians thought only of what was plausible to themselves, and had no regard to us. For, asserting the first principles to be gods and born of gods, they say that the beings which did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal; and clearly they are using words which are familiar to themselves, yet what they have said about the very application of these causes is above our comprehension. For if the gods taste of nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure, these are in no wise the causes of their existence; and if they taste them to maintain their existence, how can gods who need food be eternal? – But into the subtleties of the mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously… [Italics added]
Aristotle adds a point that is especially appropriate for those who claim so many meanings for the word ‘God’ (e.g., God is Good, God is the creator of all, God is love, etc.):
If, however, they [i.e., definitions of words] were not limited, but one were to say that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning our reasoning with one another, and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated…
Similar continues to this day. Thus, if you engage in discussions with religious people about their god, then if you don’t want “reasoning… [to be] annihilated”, first demand a clear and unique definition of their ‘god’ – rather than their usual definition, which is some version or other of: “I dunno”!

But in the end, Aristotle was unable to overcome the entrenched, self-serving interests of the clerics in ancient Greece: they (and after them, Christian and Muslim clerics) lapped up Plato’s ideas like warm milk (and are still doing so, 2400 years later), causing Aristotle major problems. Thus, as described in the Wikipedia article on Aristotle, which also refers to Aristotle’s former student, Alexander the Great:
Upon Alexander’s death, anti-Macedonian sentiment in Athens once again flared. Eurymedon the hierophant [a priest who “interpreted sacred mysteries”] denounced Aristotle for not holding the gods in honor. Aristotle fled the city to his mother’s family estate in Chalcis, explaining, “I will not allow the Athenians to sin twice against philosophy,” a reference to Athens’s prior trial and execution of Socrates.
Looked at differently, the real “sacred mystery” was how clerics managed to dupe and enslave so many people for so long! But Aristotle saw how power mongers used religion to their advantage:
Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies [the planets] are gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency… [For example] A tyrant must put on the appearance of uncommon devotion to religion. Subjects are less apprehensive of illegal treatment from a ruler whom they consider god-fearing and pious. On the other hand, they do less easily move against him, believing that he has the gods on his side.
As the Greek historian Polybius (c.204–c.122 BCE) later summarized:
Since the masses of the people are inconsistent, full of unruly desires, passionate, and reckless of consequences, they must be filled with fears to keep them in order. The ancients did well, therefore, to invent gods and the belief in punishment after death.
Thus, the clerics duped and enslaved people (and still do) by capitalizing on people’s ignorance, egotism, fears, and greed (e.g., for eternal life).

It’s clear why the Greek clerics were so opposed to Aristotle’s idea of God – and why, still today, all clerics continue to oppose his idea, instead promoting Plato’s prattle: if God is consumed by contemplating his own navel (or, according to Aristotle, thinking about himself), than there’s no need for clerics. The clerics therefore realized that Aristotle’s “heretical ideas” had to be stopped, since they undermined the clerics’ con games, threatening the clerics with what frightens them the most: the possibility that they might need to actually do something productive, like go out into the real world and work for a living! No cleric will willingly work; so, the ancient Greek clerics (and all clerics ever since) chose the easier route: stir the rabble to reject Aristotle’s idea.

And thus, once again, the clerical quacks stymied science and humanity with their God Lie, just as they subsequently have done for more than 2300 years. Fortunately for us in the West, progress has been made constraining the clerics, permitting science and human rights to advance (although much still needs to be done to constrain the damnable Christian clerics in the U.S.), but unfortunately for all of us, Islamic clerics still enshroud most of the Muslim world in their version of the Dark Ages, caused by clerical power-mongering and the people’s ignorance, egotism, fears, and greed. With the internet, maybe it won't be too much longer before such ignorance and arrogance are dispelled.

www.zenofzero.net

2009/12/19

Clerical Quackery 6 – Physics versus Metaphysics in Ancient Greece – 2 – Plato


This is the 26th in a series of posts dealing with what I call “the God Lie”, the 6th in a subseries dealing with “Clerical Quackery”, and the 2nd in the sub-subseries (!) dealing with “Physics vs. Metaphysics in Ancient Greece”, i.e., dealing with skirmishes and battles that occurred in Ancient Greece in the war between science and religion (or between realism and mysticism), a war that has been waged for at least 2500 years and continues today (e.g., in the war between the “modern world” and “Muslim supremacists”).

Early in ancient Greece (as I outlined in the previous post) one side of this war was taken by the superstitious Greek “rabble”, their clerics, and other “metaphysicists” (or more accurately, ‘mystics’), including Homer, Hesiod, Heraclitus (partially), and Pythagoras (completely). On the other side were the first few physicists (i.e., those who tried to understand ‘nature’; Greek, phusis), including Thales (“water is the cause of all things”), partially Xenophanes (“…all is but a woven web of guesses”), Anaxagoras (who suggested the Sun is a “red-hot stone”, rather than a god), Protagoras (“concerning the gods, I have no means of knowing whether they exist or not…”), and Democritus (“by convention there is color, by convention sweetness, by convention bitterness, but in reality there are atoms and space”).

Approximately 400 years after Homer and Hesiod, Socrates (469–399 BCE) seems to have tried to stay neutral in the war between science and religion, but he managed to offend the religious rabble and their clerics – who have always been eager to kill for their cause (perhaps because, beneath all their bluster, they know they’ve bought into a bill of goods, i.e., the God Lie). Yet, whatever the cause, after a trial that mocked justice, Socrates was found guilty and executed. The official verdict was:
Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods in which the state believes, but brings in other new divinities; he also wrongs by corrupting the youth.
After Socrates’ execution, of course the battle between science and religion continued, with the next two primary combatants being the two most famous Greek philosophers, namely, Socrates’ student Plato (c.428–c.348 BCE) and Plato’s student Aristotle (384–322 BCE). As I plan to outline in the next post, Aristotle unfortunately engaged in some (useless) metaphysical speculations but also contributed a little to physics (including meteorology), quite a bit to biology (a branch of phusis), and a lot to logic. For this post my goal is to at least outline some of the subterfuge promoted by Plato, who was a mystic – arguably, the most evil mystic the world has even known (using ‘evil’ in the sense of harm done to humanity). That is, it was Plato’s “Forms” into which later tyrants (including “Saint” Constantine, Muhammad, al-Wahhab, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Khomeini) poured their concrete for the foundations of their abominations, including various versions of Christianity, Islam, Fascism, and Communism.

Before trying to explain what I mean, however, I should point out a complication about the word ‘existence’ that Plato apparently never appreciated and that has subsequently caused considerable confusion throughout the world, especially among the religious. This confusion has arisen because the word ‘existence’ has multiple meanings. In what follows (except for cases in which I trust that my meaning will be obvious), I’ll distinguish two meanings for ‘existence’ by using the expanded phrases “exists in reality” versus “exists only as an idea”.

By “exists in reality” I’ll mean that some type of measurement can be made on the subject and that independent observers generally agree on the results. For example, I expect that most observers would agree that, e.g., the Empire State Building “exits in reality”. On the other hand, by “exists only as an idea” I’ll mean that such measurements aren’t possible – although, in such cases, it might be possible to measure associated brain waves, but I’ll then describe the brain waves as “existing in reality” (as electro-chemical signals within someone’s brain), without meaning to confirm that what is being thought about also exists in reality. As illustrations, there’s no evidence to support the assumption that God (or any god) exists (or has ever existed) in reality, but meanwhile, there’s no doubt that various gods exist and have existed as ideas – otherwise, I wouldn’t be wasting so much time writing about the God Lie (which, fundamentally, is the lie that any god has ever existed in reality).

In ancient Greece, enormous confusion arose (and persists in religious people to this day!) because so many otherwise-brilliant people didn’t (and foolish and/or uneducated religious people still don’t) distinguish between what exists in reality and what exists only as ideas. Unfortunately for the world, the distinction between the two meanings for ‘existence’ never penetrated Plato’s thick skull. [By the way, but maybe not entirely incidentally, ‘Plato’ was his nickname, meaning ‘broad’ or ‘thick’, suggested to refer to the size of his forehead!]

Plato as an Aspiring Mathematician
To try to uncover possible reasons why Plato managed to cause the world so much trouble, it might be useful to explore Plato’s background. In that regard, Aristotle mentions that Plato (born of a wealthy Athenian family with genetic lineage to the famous Athenian legislator, Solon, c.630–c.560 BCE) was first a student of Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus. As I mentioned in the previous post, Heraclitus was the Ionian who studied under Thales and who is famous for his ideas of the Logos [which is used in the New Testament and which probably was an idea that he or Thales adapted from the Egyptian idea of Ma’at or Zarathustra’s idea of Asha] and is famous for his idea “the attunement of opposite tensions” [which became known as “the dialectic”, which Hegel (1770–1831) promoted to try to find a synthesis of a thesis and its antithesis and which Marx (1818–83) used to formulate his dialectic materialism]. Heraclitus is also famous for his statements, “all is flux; nothing stays still… nothing endures but change” – a concept that apparently caused Plato a great deal of anxiety, resulting in his imagining ideal things (called “Forms”) that never change.

After serving in the military from 409–404 BCE (during the war between Athens and Sparta) Plato apparently decided to become a playwright (which presumably explains why Plato expounded his philosophy via dialogues). Thus, in Hermes and Plato (partially available at Google books) Edouard Shure (1841–1929) states:
At the age of twenty-seven he [Plato] had written several tragedies and was about to offer one for competition. It was about this time that Plato met Socrates, who was discussing with some youths in the gardens of the Academy. He was speaking about the Just and the Unjust, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True. The poet drew near to the philosopher, listened to him, and returned on the morrow and for several days afterwards. At the end of a few weeks, his mind had undergone a complete revolution… Another Plato had been born in him, as he listened to the words of the one who called himself “the one who brings souls to birth.” The important thing, he (Socrates) said, was to believe in the Just and the True, and to apply them to life. Plato had received from Socrates the great impulse, the active male principle of his life, his faith in justice and truth. He was indebted for the science and substance of his ideas to his initiation into the Mysteries, and his genius consists in the new form, at once poetic and dialectic, he was enabled to give to them.
How Plato became “initiated” into the above-mentioned “Mysteries” seems unclear. After what was essentially the murder of Socrates, Plato probably distrusted the Greek “rabble” and their clerics, and left Athens. Thus, as given in The History of Science and Religion in the Western Tradition – An Encyclopedia:
Soon after Socrates' death in 399 BCE, Plato apparently left Athens for Megara [a city in Attica, Greece], where he visited Euclides (450–380 BCE), founder of the Megarian school [and another of Socrates’ students, who was present at his death and who famously and importantly rejected arguments by analogy]; Cyrene [a Greek colony in what is now Libya], where he visited the mathematician Theodorus (c.460–390 BCE) [famous for what’s now called “the Spiral of Theodorus”]; and Italy, where he visited the Pythagorean Philolaus (c.470–390 BCE)…
It therefore appears that, soon after Socrates’ death, the erstwhile playwright Plato immersed himself in the field of (pure) mathematics.

Relative to Plato’s “Theory of Forms”, it’s relevant to point out an important distinction between “pure” vs. “applied” mathematics. Applied math has been “the queen of science” ever since the first cave-woman divided the available meat into an appropriate number of portions and told her man to go out and get a half dozen more logs for the fire! Subsequently, applied math was used by architects, bureaucrats, engineers, etc. to build irrigation systems and dwellings, divide property, and collect taxes. Pure math, on the other hand, caught the attention of the first metaphysicist who noticed that 1 + 1 = 2, no matter the things being counted (pieces of meat, logs, taxes, stars, whatever); that is, pure math is an abstraction from reality. To this day, applied math continues to be the fundamental tool used in all branches of science, and pure math (which isn’t a branch of science) continues to be “merely” an abstraction – albeit sometimes extremely useful (e.g., in the formulation of general relativity, quantum mechanics, particle physics, and string theory).

Not incidentally, a hint of differences in mental attitudes of people who pursue pure math vs. science is available from relatively recent data about members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Thus, although I consider it disgraceful that 7% of NAS members “believe in a personal god” (because members of the Academy are charged with conveying their collective opinion to the U.S. Congress based on evidence, and yet, 7% believe in the existence in reality of “a personal god”, even though, in reality, there’s zero evidence to support such an opinion!), but for present purposes, it’s more interesting to note that “the highest rate of belief in god was found among mathematicians (14.3%)” – and if some of them are pure mathematicians (as they probably are) they shouldn’t even be members of the National Academy of Sciences! The result suggests that, to this day, pure math continues to be a fertile field for mystics, i.e., those who have yet to develop the critically important habit of basing their ideas, opinions, and beliefs on evidence – which was Plato’s fatal error.

Plato apparently concluded that (pure) mathematics (which includes the study of the geometry of perfect, idealized forms) leads to knowledge of “the truth”, not just in mathematics. Thus, in his most famous book, The Republic, Plato wrote (bk. VII):
… the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient… Geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.
Approximately two decades after Socrates’ execution and after visiting and (no doubt) learning from the leading (pure) mathematicians around the Mediterranean Basin, Plato returned to Athens and established his own school (the original “Academy”, derived from the name of the man, Academos, who had formerly owned the land on which Plato’s school was established). The motto of Plato’s Academy was reportedly: “Let no one unversed in geometry enter here.”

Plato the Mystic
Just what “truth” Plato claimed he discovered via math, he purposefully shrouded in mystery: apparently he was “an initiate” in the Pythagorean (or other) “Mysteries”, details of which he apparently swore not to reveal. Thus, in the Seventh Letter of his Epistles (i.e., “letters”) Plato wrote:
There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith [of the Mysteries], for it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies, but as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden [in an “epiphany”, from Greek epiphaninein, meaning ‘reveal’] as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes itself.
Plato adds that such secrecy is necessary in order not “to expose [the Mysteries] to unseemly and degrading treatment”, and in his book Phaedo, he claims:
Whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods.
As for just what these Mysteries were (permitting one to “dwell with the gods”), it’s a long story – one that I plan to describe in at least a little detail in a later post dealing with one aspect of the creation of Christianity. Here I’ll give just a very brief introduction.

In general, the Mysteries about how to enter “the spirit world” are as old as stone-age use by shamans of hallucinogenic plants (or “psychotropic substances” or “entheogens”, a Greek word meaning “becoming divine within”) and as old as the first instance of any of a variety of brain disorders, including epilepsy and schizophrenia (originally called “sacred diseases”), which in turn can be caused by, e.g., genetic anomalies, physical trauma, or chemical imbalances in the brain. From the time that writing first became available (in about 3000 BCE, with one of the first records being a recipe for making beer!), reports are available about the use of “mind-warping drugs”, including the Hindu’s soma, the Zoroastrian’s homa, and as readers can find from the internet, Wasson and colleagues have proposed that “a psychoactive brew from mushrooms” was probably used for induction into the “Eleusinian Mysteries” (at Eleusis, a city near Athens) by the ancient Greeks, possibly including Plato.

But whatever the cause might have been (drugs or trauma or…), the result was that Plato “went mystic”, causing humanity an enormous amount of harm, comparable to the harm caused by (the epileptic?) “Saint” Paul (the real founder of Christianity) and by (the brain-damaged?) Muhammad. In his famous cave analogy, Plato leaves no doubt that he (egotistically and even maniacally) considered himself to be the one who climbed out of the cave and saw “the true nature of reality” in the full light of day, while the rest of us mere mortals were left behind in the fire-lit cave, trying to make sense of shadows on the walls.

Plato’s Forms
As already illustrated, Plato said he wouldn’t write about the Mysteries, but apparently he did give lecture about them, and from the “lecture notes” of Plato’s most famous student, Aristotle, it appears that Plato pursued the craziness promoted by Pythagoras. An example is the following, copied from Aristotle’s Metaphysics (bk. 1, pt. 6):
After the systems we have named [developed by Pythagoras and others] came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians [i.e., the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics]. For, having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he [Plato] held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal [in] these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind – for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing [consistent with what Plato had learned of the thoughts of Heraclitus]. Things of this other sort [fixed things], then, he called Ideas [or Forms], and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas [or Forms] that have the same name as they. Only the name ‘participation’ was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by ‘imitation’ of numbers, and Plato says they exist by ‘participation’, changing the name. But what the ‘participation’ or the ‘imitation’ of the Forms could be, they left an open question.

Further, besides sensible things and Forms he [Plato] says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, [differing] from Forms in that there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique. Since the Forms were the causes of all other things, he thought their elements were the elements of all things. As matter, the great and the small were principles; as essential reality, the One; for from the great and the small, by participation in the One, come the Numbers. But he agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate [or description] of something else; and in saying that the Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things, he agreed with them…
In his book On the Soul (bk. I, pt. 2), Aristotle described Plato’s views more succinctly:
Again he [Plato] puts his view in yet other terms: Mind is the monad [unity, i.e., 1], science or knowledge the dyad [i.e., 2] (because it goes undeviatingly from one point to another), opinion the number of the plane [3], sensation the number of the solid [4]; the numbers are by him expressly identified with the Forms themselves or principles, and are formed out of the elements…
It seems appropriate to add a few comments about what poor-old Plato was apparently trying to do, namely, trying to identify “the fundamental stuff behind reality”.

As I mentioned in the prior post, for approximately 200 years prior to Plato people speculated about such “fundamental stuff”. Thus, first Thales (c.624–c.545 BCE) claimed it was water; subsequently, Anaximander (c.610–c.546 BCE) claimed it was something indefinite, which he called apeiron; Anaximenes of Miletus (c.585–c.528 BCE) claimed it was air; Heraclitus (c.535–c.475 BCE) claimed it was fire (which may have been symbolic for “change”); Anaxagoras (c.500–c.428 BCE) claimed it was nous (God’s thoughts); others claimed it was various combinations (e.g., earth, air, water, and fire) and processes; and Democritus (c.460–c.370 BCE) claimed it was atoms and space. Plato apparently adopted Pythagoras’ claim that the “fundamental stuff behind reality” was ideas or “Forms”, which could be represented by numbers. Incidentally, today, most physicists would probably say that “the fundamental reality” (at least in our universe) is that “energy exists and exchanges”, whatever energy might be!

As for more details about Plato’s Theory of Forms, it’s unfortunately difficult to find a concise summary in Plato’s works – because Plato apparently never wrote anything concisely! In particular (as I partially reviewed in an earlier chapter), in The Republic Plato pretends that Socrates is discussing various ideas with a variety of other people, and from the resulting “dialogues”, some idea of Plato’s Forms is available. The following pieces are illustrative.
First… let me remind you of the distinction… between [on the one hand] the multiplicity of things that we call good or beautiful or whatever it may be and, on the other hand, Goodness itself or Beauty itself and so on. Corresponding to each of these sets of many things, we postulate a single Form or Real Essence, as we call it.
With this, Plato is apparently proposing that, because there are a number of cases of, e.g., “good”, therefore (according to Plato), there is such a “thing” as Good (with a capital “G”, no less!), which has the property (unsurprisingly!) of “Goodness”. Thereby, he apparently didn’t appreciate that ‘goodness’ is subjective and depends on the subject’s objectives. Even more strangely, Plato proposed that this ideal “Good” actually exists (not just as ideas but in reality!) – and even worse, that “the Good” is what “believers” call ‘God’ – and still worse, that if people didn’t believe him, then they should be executed!

Now if readers think that Plato couldn’t have been so dumb and so horrible as I’ve suggested, then I invite them to read the junk that Plato wrote. Below, I’ll comment on a tiny percentage of his writings, mostly from his most notorious book, The Republic. To start, what follows is a sample of Plato’s illogical, despicable, despotic writings, to which I’ve added some notes in brackets.
It [Goodness] is the cause of knowledge and truth. [What nonsense! “It {Goodness}” isn’t “the cause of knowledge” or “truth”. Knowledge is gained by people trying to understand. Closed-system truth is defined by whoever concocts the game (e.g., games of poker, baseball, pure math, or various religion). Open-system truth is what people try to determine – and it’s apparently done best by applying the scientific method.] And so, while you may think of it [Goodness] as an object of knowledge [What stupidity! Who considers “Goodness {or goodness} as an object of knowledge”? “Goodness” is a descriptor used to describe some object or process, e.g., Plato’s thinking is the opposite from “goodness”!], you will do well to regard it as something beyond truth and knowledge and, precious as these both are, of still higher worth… [Objects of knowledge] derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power.
There’s so much drivel in Plato’s final sentence, above, that it’s difficult to know where to start criticizing it! But starting with the first claim, consider: “{Objects of knowledge} derive from the Good… their power of being known.” Hello? Suppose my “object of knowledge” is how to correct Plato’s dumb statements. I suppose that they do have some “power of being known”, but this power isn’t “derive{d} from the Good.” Their “power of being known” is derived from so many people, over so many centuries, failing to see that what Plato is peddling is pure bunk; therefore, the “power” is derived not from anything good but from ignorance, gullibility, acquiescence to authority, etc., none of which is beneficial to the continuation of humans, i.e., it’s derived from what most humans consider to be evil, not good. Then there’s “Goodness is not the same thing as being.” Duh. Who said it was? And then the finale: “[Goodness is] even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power.” Hello? Pray tell what “beyond being” means? Does Plato mean it’s just an idea? If so, then how does an idea surpass “being” “in dignity and power”? I know a lot of ideas that aren’t dignified at all (funny how easily so many examples come to mind when reading Plato!), and as for the “power” of such ideas, apparently Plato never thought about how wimpy such ideas would be if the Sun’s power switched off!

As I wrote in an earlier chapter, it’s easy to imagine how one person’s mind can “go around the bend” as badly as Plato’s did (especially if he used mind-warping drugs), but what’s so amazing is that so many people (over so many centuries!) followed him around the same bend. The source of his leaps over logic seems to be simply his use of a capital letter. Thus, what he does, first, is play some grammatical games, starting with a perfectly good adjective (similar to ‘red’, as in “the red barn”). Next, he turns the adjective into a noun (as in “the barn’s redness is fading”). Then, he uses it as a subject – complete with a capital letter (“Yet, the Redness persists!”). Once he has the capital letter, he then gives this “noun” any attribute he desires: “For this Redness is the best of colors: the color of the most beautiful roses and sunsets, the color that transmits heat throughout the universe, the color that gives power to blood, and therefore – as must be obvious to all – Redness is the supreme color, chosen by the gods themselves”! Then, still worse, in The Republic Plato takes the next horrible step in his idiocy, which in this case would be: “People who refuse to recognize Red to be the supreme color should be executed.”

Now, I’m certainly not the first person to criticize Plato’s nonsense. One of the most penetrating criticisms is contained in a story about the Greek philosopher Diogenes (c.400–c.325 BCE), the most famous of the Cynics (the one who, readers might remember, was famous for wandering around Athens, “searching for an honest man”). The following is quoted from David Quinn’s webpage:
Plato was discoursing on his Theory of Ideas [or Forms] and, pointing to the cups on the table before him, said while there are many cups in the world, there is only one ‘idea’ of a cup, and this ‘cupness’ precedes the existence of all particular cups.

"I can see the cup on the table," interrupted Diogenes, "but I can't see the ‘cupness’.”

"That's because you have the eyes to see the cup," said Plato, "but", tapping his head with his forefinger, "you don't have the intellect with which to comprehend ‘cupness'."

Diogenes walked up to the table, examined a cup and, looking inside, asked, "Is it empty?"

Plato nodded.

“Where is the ‘emptiness’ that precedes this empty cup?" asked Diogenes.

Plato allowed himself a few moments to collect his thoughts, but Diogenes reached over and, tapping Plato's head with his finger, said, "I think you will find: here is the ‘emptiness’."
I don’t know if, in the subsequent ~2400 years, anyone clobbered Plato’s Theory of Forms so well as Diogenes did!

Plato’s Ideas About Souls, Gods, and Creation
Now, although it’s essentially impossible to show details about any of Plato’s ideas without quoting pages and pages of rambling “dialogue”, I’ll try to get by with just sketching his ideas about souls and gods, etc. In an earlier chapter, starting on p.16, I already went through the idiocy of Plato’s hypothesis about souls – as well as some of the horrible consequences, because so many Christians, Muslims, etc. adopted the same nonsense. In summary, Plato took huge leaps past logic to “demonstrate” (or more likely, to copy from Pythagoras – who in turn seems to have copied the idea from Zoroastrian priests, who in turn may have copied the idea from Egyptian or Indian priests!) that humans have “souls” that “existed before we were born” (because we know the “ideal Forms” without ever experiencing them while we’re alive). He concludes the idiocy with his asinine statement:
So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that… concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, [no] other account [can] be given than this… namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be the gods…
As for Plato’s proposal of how his principal god allegedly created everything, I expect that, without reading Plato’s junk for themselves, readers would have difficulty believing that anyone could propose such nonsense. Therefore, as a sample, consider Plato’s following “explanation” (as given in his book Timaeus) of how his God created everything (and why!), to which I’ve again added the notes in brackets.
Let me tell you then why the creator made this world of generation. He was good [Define ‘good’! ‘Good’ is a value, and values can be measured only with respect to some objective. What was your god’s objective? Was he bored and wanted to watch how ant-like people struggle to survive? Does he get his kicks from watching people suffer? Was he into voyeurism and just wanted to watch? And if so, how can you describe your wimpy, sadistic, voyeuristic god as ‘good’?], and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. [Oh come off it! Someone (such as you) can be jealous of a person who can think clearly – and that would be good!] And being free from jealousy [Really? Or is your god jealous of people who have the fortitude to struggle to survive in the face of their inevitable death?], he desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be. [You mean that your egotistical god (desiring that “all things should be as like himself as they could be”) is such a wimp that he couldn’t make it easier for people to survive? Is that ‘good’?]

This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of the world [according to the egomaniac Plato], as we shall do well in believing the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. [Do you mean that there are some things that your god is powerless to do? Don’t you worry that your god will reprimand you for describing him as a wimp?] Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest [What “visible sphere”? Do you mean that there was something here before god? Who or what created it? And for that matter, who created your wimpy god?], but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way better than the other. [So, your god only cleans up messes – sort of like your mother? Yah, I can believe that: your mother is your god. But the question is: who will clean up the mess you’re now making?]

Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest [Define ‘fairest’! It’s another value judgment – with meaning only relative to some goal. Was your god’s goal that all the gods would have the same (voyeuristic) view of the people? That would be fair! Why should it be only your god who gets to watch people have sex?!]; and the creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible [Do you mean that your wimpy god can’t see things in the infrared or ultraviolet?!], found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole [What a crazy use of the word ‘fairer’! Do you mean ‘better’? And if you mean ‘better’, then again I’d ask: measured against what objective? For example, for those creatures living in the oceans, then much better than to have the ‘intelligence’ that you claim to possess is to have gills!]; and that intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul. [Oh, do tell! And what data, pray tell, support your speculation that living things have ‘souls’? Oh, sorry, I forgot: you don’t have a clue what the word ‘data’ means, do you? Okay, then, let’s see where your wild speculation about the existence of ‘souls’ leads you.] For which reason, when he was framing the universe [So, now, you have your god just ‘framing’ the universe! Someone or something else created it (I presume), and your god just puts a frame around it!], he put intelligence in soul [Oh neat! In an unknown, unspecified, thing called ‘soul’ (whose existence in reality isn’t supported by a shred of data), your god manages to stuff ‘intelligence’ into it. If he (and you) wouldn’t mind some advice, I’d suggest that such a move wasn’t a very intelligent thing to do!], and soul in body [Oh great: inside bodies, your god stuffs an undefined, unmeasured, hypothetical thing called ‘soul’ that contains some unspecified type of ‘intelligence’ – to do what, breathe underwater? And I wonder if your god has the intelligence to see that you’re just bandying about meaningless words, conveying no information, and demonstrating zero intelligence?], that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best. [‘Fairest’ for what? ‘Best’ for what? (Besides possibly lulling people into ‘thinking’ that you know what the devil you’re talking about.)] Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God. [The “language of probability”? Somebody’s gotta be kidding! And all of this total nonsense resulted in your proposing that the world “became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence”? The world is living? In what sense do you use the word ‘living’? In what sense do you use the word ‘intelligence’? Other living things reproduce. Does the world? Other living things try to continue to live. Does the world? ‘Intelligence’ means “the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills.” Does the world do that? Do you feel no constraint, whatsoever, in your choice of words?!]

This being supposed [Ah! So, all the above was just a supposition, as in, “Let’s pretend.” And yet, later, you’ll propose that people who don’t believe in your god should be executed! But if it’s all just pretend, then who but an idiot – or better, an egotistical maniac – would propose to kill people who refuse to play your game of make believe!], let us proceed to the next stage: In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? [Hello? If your god is just now creating the world, what’s with the animals? Where did they come from? Where do they live? I mean, it’s one thing to put the cart in front of the horse, but this is ridiculous: as yet, there are no horses!] It would be an unworthy thing to liken it [the world] to any nature which exists as a part only; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing [What astounding nonsense! The nutcake Plato is claiming that something “which exists as a part only” is imperfect. Duh. How about an atom of someone’s body. Is the atom “imperfect”?! In addition, he’s saying that something that exists only as a part can’t be beautiful. Who in hell is he to say what’s beautiful? I say that the part of my daughter’s hair glistening in the Sun is beautiful – and to be blunt, I don’t give a damn if anyone disagrees with me.]; but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions. [You’re imagining that the world is the image of all animals? Boy, you have one powerfully weird imagination!] For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings [Oh? Do tell! But first, pray tell, what the devil do you mean by “the original of the universe”?! Is this one just a replication of “the original”? Where did “the original” come from? And this “original” contains all intelligible beings? Are you and I and everyone else in “the original of the universe”? And, just out of idle curiosity: where did you say the data are that support your crazy idea?!], just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. [Hello? This world “comprehends us”? ‘Comprehends’ in the dictionary sense of “to grasp mentally; understand”? Have you considered seeing a psychiatrist?] For the Deity, intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings [Your god made the world an intelligent being? Bizarre!], framed one visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a kindred nature. [Plato: if you’re not just clowning around, you really otta have your head examined.]

Are we right in saying that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite? [I have a suggestion: why don’t you seek some data, rather than just continue with your wild speculations.] There must be one only, if the created copy is to accord with the original. [It’s astounding that a single sentence can contain so much stupidity! It means, obviously, that it’s possible to make only one photocopy of any document. Thanks a lot, Plato: you just decimated by Xerox and Toshiba stocks!] For that which includes all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in that case there would be need of another living being which would include both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would be more truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included them. In order, then, that the world might be solitary, like the perfect animal, the creator made not two worlds or an infinite number of them; but there is and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven. [Although, come to think of it, what’s really astounding is why any sane person would ever have paid any attention to the stupidities that Plato produced. And so, given that this crap is the basis of Christianity and Islam, it seems reasonable to question the sanity of Christians and Muslims!]

Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also visible and tangible. [Really? I can create ideas (just as you obviously can) none of which need be “corporeal” or “visible and tangible”. And in your case, the ideas are definitely not sensible!] And nothing is visible where there is no fire [Hello? Have you ever seen a piece of ice?!], or tangible which has no solidity [Hello? Have you ever felt the wind and rain on your face?], and nothing is solid without earth [Hello? Have you ever gone skating on ice, i.e., frozen water?]. Wherefore also God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth. [Hello? What was burning – besides your other brain in “the original universe”?] But two things cannot be rightly put together without a third [I guess Plato was into group sex!]; there must be some bond of union between them. And the fairest bond [I wonder if he meant to write “the fairest blonde”!] is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines; and proportion is best adapted to effect such a union. [Maybe that means he likes women of particular sizes and proportions!] For whenever in any three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to the last term what the first term is to it; and again, when the mean is to the first term as the last term is to the mean – then the mean becoming first and last, and the first and last both becoming means, they will all of them of necessity come to be the same, and having become the same with one another will be all one. [Wow! Talk about kinky sex! And wouldn’t you know that he’d try to squeeze some math into his machinations?!]

If the universal frame had been created a surface only and having no depth, a single mean would have sufficed to bind together itself and the other terms; but now, as the world must be solid [imagine how it would have shaken up poor Plato if he had learned that most of the Earth (including the oceans and the Earth’s interior) is liquid!], and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by two [now, there’s a bizarre theory that fortunately no longer pollutes the world!], God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth); and thus he bound and put together a visible and tangible heaven. [Damn, but that’s gotta be close to the craziest gibberish ever concocted!] And for these reasons, and out of such elements which are in number four, the body of the world was created, and it was harmonized by proportion, and therefore has the spirit of friendship; and having been reconciled to itself, it was indissoluble by the hand of any other than the framer.
Sorry, but that’s all of Plato’s crap on the creation of the world that I can take. Yet, I should give credit where credit is due. Thus, Plato accomplished what many would consider to be impossible: he managed to make the Bible’s creation myths look good!

And then there’s Plato’s crazy “proof” of the existence of each person’s “immortal soul”, given in The Republic (bk. X), in an alleged discussion between Socrates & Glaucon:
Are you not aware, I [allegedly Socrates] said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

He [Glaucon] looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too – there is no difficulty in proving it.

I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light.

Listen then.

I am attending.

There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?

Yes, he replied.

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?

Yes. [Really? What about that which corrupts and destroys viruses? Care to define ‘evil’ and ‘good’?]

And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease?

Yes, he said. [Come off it! It depends on the definitions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.]

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

True. [No it’s not! For example, we who want to live describe that which threatens our lives to be evil, but such a description is subjective. A virus, in and of itself, isn’t evil; it, too, just “wants” to survive. To the virus, that which threatens it (e.g., modern medicine) is evil!]

The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly not. [What garbage! First, it isn’t necessarily correct that “the vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each”; for example, there are a huge number of causes of the destruction of humans (from floods to earthquakes), none of which reflect inherent vices and evils of humans. Second, we humans might describe as “good”, for example, that which kills some dangerous virus, but for the virus, our “good” is its “evil”!]

If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?

That may be assumed. [Well, it may be, but it would certainly be stupid to do so! For example, as far as is known, an iron atom has a number of “inherent corruptions” (in that its electrons would merge with the protons in its nucleus, except for the need to preserve the electrons’ angular momenta, and its protons would repel one another, destroying the nucleus, except for the strong, attractive, nuclear force. Yet, although we find that the iron atom “having this inherent corruption” does not dissolve or self-destruct, the iron nucleus can be destroyed, e.g., by bombarding it with neutrons. Consequently, since at least one such case exists (although no doubt there are thousands more!), it’s incorrect to say “we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction.”]

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?

Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. [Depending on what might be meant by the undefined word ‘soul’!]

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her? – and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Yes. [No: not only is it untrue, it’s meaningless!]

Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?

Certainly not. [What nonsense! Suppose (in contrast to these word games) one considers only those concepts corresponding to things and processes whose existence (in reality) can be measured, e.g., rather than ‘soul’, consider ‘character’, and as an instance of ‘character’, consider “the ability to get along with others”, measures of which can be defined and made. Then, obviously this measure of a person’s “soul” (i.e., “the ability to get along with others”) can, in fact, be “corrupted” (or diminished or impaired), e.g., if the person is a murder, thief, philanderer, etc.]

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?

[And so on this rambling nonsense continues, not worth that paper it’s written on and certainly not worth reading in more detail, leading to Plato’s:]

…But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist forever, and if existing forever, must be immortal?

Certainly.

That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.
Plato’s idiocy about “immortal souls” (quoted above) is obviously just word games. In reality, the “souls” that Plato postulates exist not in reality but only as ideas – and illogical, nonsensical ideas at that! As Thomas Jefferson wrote (when he was 71 years old) in his 5 July 1814 letter to John Adams (his friend and also a former president):
Having more leisure… for reading, I amused myself with reading seriously Plato’s Republic. I am wrong, however, in calling it amusement, for it was the heaviest task-work I ever went through. I had occasionally before taken up some of his other works, but scarcely ever had patience to go through a whole dialogue. While wading through the whimsies, the puerilities, and unintelligible jargon of this work, I laid it down often to ask myself how it could have been that the world should have so long consented to give reputation to such nonsense as this?
Plato’s Utopia
Actually, though, Plato’s “whimsies, puerilities, and unintelligible jargon” leads him to much worse than his speculations about souls and gods: ideologue that he was, it led him to promote a horrible dictatorship, as I’ll outline below. In what follows, though, I won’t add detailed, sarcastic comments. Instead, in the main, I’ll let Plato’s evil (his idiocy), which follows by deduction from his bizarre, unverified and unverifiable assumptions, speak for itself. In the main, I’ll just group his ideas under the listed headings.

1. Plato’s proposal that, in the republic that he is designing, ideas will be censored. In particular, attempting to address the problem of evil, Plato proposed that God would be depicted only as good. The following is from The Republic, bk. II, with the dialogue allegedly between Socrates and Adeimantus:
Then the first thing [allegedly said by Socrates] will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded…

But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them? [Adeimantus allegedly asks.]

A fault which is most serious, I [allegedly Socrates] said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes – as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blamable; but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies, in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too – I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.

Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.

Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated…

… all the battles of the gods in Homer – these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking – how shall we answer him?

I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Something of this kind, I replied: God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given.

Right.

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?

Certainly.

And no good thing is hurtful?

No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not.

And that which hurts not does no evil?

No.

And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

Impossible.

And the good is advantageous?

Yes.

And therefore the cause of well-being?

Yes.

It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?

Assuredly.

Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.

That appears to me to be most true, he said.

Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots, and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good; but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill, Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth… he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery – the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.

I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.

Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform – that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.

That will do, he said.

And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another – sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every god remains absolutely and for ever in his own form…

Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon…

These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.

I entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them my laws.
2. Plato’s mistaken ideas about heroism and his advocacy of lying (from The Republic, bk. III, allegedly a dialogue between Socrates and Adeimantus):
Such then, I said, are our principles of theology – some tales are to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards, if we mean them to honor the gods and their parents, and to value friendship with one another.

Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.

But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?

Certainly not, he said. [What a horrible, moronic conclusion! The exact opposite is closer to the truth. Courage is not the absence of fear but the ability to face one’s fears. If one is unafraid of death (e.g., deluded into imagining “life-after-death”), then it takes no courage to face death. The result is the crazy Muslim’s cry: “We love death!” What’s courageous is to do what one decides is necessary with full recognition that the result might be the end of one’s existence. As I wrote in the previous post: If you've been brainwashed into believing in a beneficent afterlife, then following clerical orders, it's logically impossible to risk your life and be a hero. What Plato is promoting is not “courage” but a way to dupe followers to blindly risk their lives to protect the rulers.]

And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible?

Impossible.

Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.

That will be our duty, he said.

Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses [from Homer, said by Achilles]

I would rather he a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than rule over all the dead who have come to naught…

Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction.

So I believe.

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed.

Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.

Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how

Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion. On your views, we must not admit them…

Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have no business with them.

Clearly not, he said.

Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellow sailors.

Most true, he said.

If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State, any of the craftsmen, whether he priest or physician or carpenter, he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State.

Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out…
3. Plato’s advocacy of communism (from The Republic, bk. III):
Then let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviors of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?

… The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing – a thing, however, which I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for our purpose.

What may that be? he asked.

Education, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says…
4. Plato’s further advocacy of political lies and his proposals that philosophers would rule and that humans would be bred and appropriately educated for their roles (from The Republic, bk. V & VI, allegedly a dialogue among Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus)
I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.

And we were very right.

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births…

I said: Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils – nor the human race, as I believe – and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day. Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing…

Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers… [And therefore his philosophers grasp nothing, since nothing is eternal and unchangeable!]… And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them – are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?

… Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all – they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

What do you mean?

I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labors and honors, whether they are worth having or not.

But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

True, he said, I had forgotten.

Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others [Oh, the poor philosophers!]; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.
5. And if you don’t buy into it, if you don’t believe in Plato’s gods, then Plato prescribed the punishment (from his last book, the Laws, bk. X, allegedly spoken by “The Athenian Stranger”):
After the prelude shall follow a discourse, which will be the interpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious persons: that they must depart from their ways and go over to the pious. And to those who disobey, let the law about impiety be as follows: If a man is guilty of any impiety in word or deed, any one who happens to present shall give information to the magistrates, in aid of the law; and let the magistrates who first receive the information bring him before the appointed court according to the law; and if a magistrate, after receiving information, refuses to act, he shall be tried for impiety at the instance of any one who is willing to vindicate the laws; and if any one be cast, the court shall estimate the punishment of each act of impiety; and let all such criminals be imprisoned. There shall be three prisons in the state: the first of them is to be the common prison in the neighborhood of the agora for the safe-keeping of the generality of offenders; another is to be in the neighborhood of the nocturnal council, and is to be called the "House of Reformation"; another, to be situated in some wild and desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by some name expressive of retribution.

Now, men fall into impiety from three causes, which have been already mentioned, and from each of these causes arise two sorts of impiety, in all six, which are worth distinguishing, and should not all have the same punishment. For he who does not believe in Gods, and yet has a righteous nature, hates the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who besides believing that the world is devoid of Gods are intemperate, and have at the same time good memories and quick wits, are worse; although both of them are unbelievers, much less injury is done by the one than by the other. The one may talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like himself, if he be not punished. But the other who holds the same opinions and is called a clever man, is full of stratagem and deceit – men of this class deal in prophecy and jugglery of all kinds, and out of their ranks sometimes come tyrants and demagogues and generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the Sophists, as they are termed, with their ingenious devices. There are many kinds of unbelievers, but two only for whom legislation is required; one the hypocritical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times over, while the other needs only bonds and admonition.

In like manner also the notion that the Gods take no thought of men produces two other sorts of crimes, and the notion that they may be propitiated produces two more. Assuming these divisions, let those who have been made what they are only from want of understanding, and not from malice or an evil nature, be placed by the judge in the House of Reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period of not less than five years. And in the meantime let them have no intercourse with the other citizens, except with members of the nocturnal council, and with them let them converse with a view to the improvement of their soul's health. And when the time of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be restored to sane company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second time, let him be punished with death.
Which, then, is surely the lowest to which any student has ever sunk: in the above, Plato in essence argues that his teacher, Socrates, deserved to die! And perhaps recognizing what he had done, he decided (for the first time?) to put his words not in the mouth of Socrates but in the mouth of “the Athenian Stranger”.

In overview, in The Republic the ideologue Plato describes his utopia, i.e., what he considers to be an “ideal” government, complete with philosophers (such as him, of course) as rulers and with censorship, indoctrination, breeding humans for assigned roles, infiltrators and informants, and prosecution (including execution) of “deviants” – just as in Orwell’s 1984. Similar to all ideologues, Plato was certain that he knew best how others should live their lives. During the subsequent 2400 years, tyrants have instigated concepts similar to those in Plato’s Republic to create their own utopias (for themselves!), including all Christian and Muslim theocrats and Communist and Fascist dictators. Indeed, The Republic is still the blueprint used by the collusions of clerics and dictators in many Muslim countries, the worst examples being in Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Which brings to mind another important paragraph in the letter from Jefferson to Adams (referenced above), since it demonstrates that Jefferson saw some of the horrors that were caused by the adoption of Plato’s ideas by the Abrahamic religions. To this Jefferson quotation, I’ve added a few notes in brackets and the italics.
In truth, he [Plato] is one of the race of genuine sophists, who has escaped the oblivion of his brethren, first by the elegance of his diction, but chiefly by the adoption and incorporation of his whimsies into the body of… Christianity [and all the Abrahamic religions]. His foggy mind is forever presenting the semblances of objects which, half seen through a mist, can be defined neither in form nor dimensions. Yet this, which should have consigned him to early oblivion, really procured him immortality of fame and reverence. The Christian priesthood… [and earlier, Jewish clerics, and later, Muslim clerics] saw in the mysticism of Plato materials with which they might build up an artificial system which might, from its indistinctness, admit everlasting controversy, give employment for their order, and introduce it to profit, power, and pre-eminence…
But Jefferson apparently couldn’t foresee how much worse Plato’s plague would harm humanity. As Jefferson wrote (essentially on his deathbed, declining an invitation to attend the 4th of July celebration in 1826):
May it be to the world, what I believe it will be (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all), the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-government. That form, which we have substituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion.

All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God.
Yet, as we now know, subsequent ideologues [such as Marx, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and various ayatollahs (such as Khomeini), would-be caliphs (such as bin Laden) and other demagogues] arose, “booted and spurred, ready to ride [the mass of mankind] legitimately, by the grace of God [or some other phantom of Plato’s fictitious Forms]”, trampling human rights, fanatically trying to create their own utopias, similar to the one described in Plato’s horrible book, The Republic. In fact, if it weren’t for the existence of the Bible, the Koran, the Book of Mormon, and other, similar, damnable “holy books”, I would classify The Republic as the most horrible book ever written – or, as a minimum, down there with other trash, such as Marx and Engels’ The Communist Manifesto, Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Khomeini’s Islamic Government, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Milestones.

All such books are similar, because all are written by ideologues with thoughts imprisoned by their own versions of Plato’s Forms, committed more to the closed-system “Truth” of their ideas than to the idea of open-system “truth”. For example, the (Shiite) leader of the Iranian revolution and subsequent dictator Khomeini wrote regarding Plato: “In the field of divinity, he [Plato] has grave and solid views…” Sure he did: as solid as his fictitious Forms! In addition, similar to Platonic megalomaniacs before and since (such as Lenin and bin Laden), Khomeini proposed: “Establishing the Islamic state world-wide belongs to the great goals of the revolution.” Currently, members of the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood vigorously (but surreptitiously) apply their own version of Plato’s Forms, with one of their goals being:
The process of settlement [in Western nations]… a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious…
I expect that Plato would have enthusiastically supported members of the Muslim Brotherhood – and Jefferson would have forcefully deported them!

[To be continued…]

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